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Game, Set, and Graph 
In the twentieth century the Theory of Games was transformed.  It began as an 
amusing pastime, and ended as a major branch of mathematical research and a 
key paradigm of economic theory. Here it will be argued that the transformation 
was the result of the work of mathematicians, such as Ernst Zermelo, John von 
Neumann and Dénes Kőnig, who also contributed to two other areas of 
mathematics that were emerging at the same time: the Theory of Sets and the 
Theory of Graphs. 
Keywords: game theory, set theory, graph theory. 
Introduction 
The theme of this paper is the interaction between three areas of mathematical 
research, Game Theory, Set Theory and Graph Theory. All three flourished in the 
twentieth century. Although their origins varied considerably, the three disciplines 
were forged by mathematicians whose interests spanned several areas of 
mathematics, and we shall explain how these links were central to the 
development of the disciplines and led to significant advances.   
 
Paris 1900 
The second International Congress of Mathematicians (ICM) took place in Paris 
in August 1900.  It is now mainly remembered for the talk delivered by David 
Hilbert, which began with a rhetorical question: ‘Who among us would not be 
glad to lift the veil behind which the future lies hidden and to cast a glance at the 
next advances of our science...’ (Hilbert 1901; English translation by Winston 
Newson 1902).  Hilbert went on to discuss 23 problems, covering many fields of 
mathematics, the solution of which, he believed, would lead to significant 
advances in the subject. Work on the problems did indeed have a profound 
influence on the development of mathematics in the twentieth century (Gray 
2000).     
Hilbert’s first problem concerned the foundations of mathematics.  In the latter 
part of the nineteenth century Cantor and Dedekind had given formal definitions of ℝ, 
the system of real numbers, also known as the continuum.  Cantor had also given a 
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good definition of the cardinal number of a set, which was particularly significant 
because it clarified the notion of infinity.  He had shown that some infinite subsets of ℝ, 
such as the set ℚ of rational numbers, had a smaller cardinal number than ℝ itself, and 
he had conjectured that no other kinds of infinity could occur among the subsets of ℝ.  
This was to become known as the continuum hypothesis (CH).  
Hilbert remarked that ‘it would follow at once that the continuum has the next 
cardinal number beyond that of the countable set’, and he speculated about how this 
result might be proved.   He referred to another statement of Cantor, concerning the 
ordering of the continuum.  The standard ordering of the real numbers has the property 
that a subset which has a lower bound need not have a least member: for example, the 
set of strictly positive real numbers has the lower bound 0, but it has no least member.  
On the other hand, the set of strictly positive integers does have a least member, 1, and 
this set is said to be well-ordered, because the property holds quite generally. ‘The 
question now arises’ said Hilbert, ‘whether the totality of all numbers [the continuum] 
may not be arranged in another manner’ so that the well-ordering property holds for it 
too. Cantor believed that this was so, but he had not been able to prove it.  This question 
was to lead, indirectly, to a significant contribution to the Theory of Games.  
 
Heidelberg 1904 
The next International Congress of Mathematicians took place in Heidelberg in 1904. 
Work on several of Hilbert’s problems was in progress, and a Hungarian 
mathematician, Gyula (Julius) Kőnig startled the congress by announcing that the 
continuum cannot be well-ordered (Ebbinghaus 2007). Furthermore, the Continuum 
Hypothesis is false! This announcement created a sensation, although several of those 
present were unconvinced – and, unfortunately, Kőnig was wrong.   
The flaw in Kőnig’s argument was quickly spotted: he had relied on a theorem 
of Bernstein which specifically did not hold under the conditions needed. Luckily, some 
ephemeral evidence of how the error was spotted has survived (Ebbinghaus 2007). One 
of those present in Heidelberg was a young German mathematician, Ernst Zermelo, who 
had been working in Göttingen where Hilbert was a professor, He had already published 
a paper on cardinal numbers, and had doubtless worked on the continuum hypothesis.  
A few weeks after the ICM he sent a postcard to his friend Max Dehn, explaining that 
he had been unable to check Bernstein’s paper at the time, but, on his return to 
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Göttingen, he had found a copy and verified that Kőnig was mistaken. He foresaw that 
‘some fine polemic will still unfold in the [Mathematische] Annalen’. In fact, Zermelo 
succeeded in proving the antithesis of Kőnig’s result, which was equally startling: every 
set can be well-ordered (Zermelo 1904; English translation in van Heijenoort 1967).   
  As he had expected, Zermelo’s proof of the well-ordering theorem did not put an 
end to controversy in the mathematical community. One reason was that he relied on a 
property of sets that he called the Auswahlaxiom; also known as the Axiom of Choice 
(AC).  The AC asserts that given any collection of non-empty sets, it is possible to 
construct a set that contains one member of each of them.  Some mathematicians 
regarded this as ‘obvious’, while others were sceptical because it seemed to have 
consequences that were highly counter-intuitive.  The publication of some 
correspondence in the Bulletin of the French Mathematical Society put the debate into 
sharp focus (Hadamard 1905).  
 
The work of Zermelo 
One result of the controversy was that Zermelo himself set out to examine the 
foundations of set theory.  Cantor had expressed his arguments in the prevailing literary 
style, and the subject was still only in its infancy.  So Zermelo hoped to establish a more 
mathematical treatment, as (for example) Peano had done with his axioms for the 
system of natural numbers. In 1908 he published two important papers.  First, he gave a 
new proof of his well-ordering theorem, in which he tried to avoid reliance on the 
Axiom of Choice (Zermelo 1908a). He also produced the first attempt to formulate 
explicitly a collection of axioms on which set theory could be based (Zermelo 1908b).  
This work was prompted partly by the ongoing controversy about the status of the AC 
and CH, but also by the fact that several difficulties in the naïve approach to the subject 
had been discovered. These difficulties led to self-contradictory statements about such 
things as the ‘set of all sets which are not members of themselves’. They were 
euphemistically classified as ‘paradoxes’ or ‘antinomies’, and Zermelo proposed to 
avoid them by imposing some restrictions on the notions of ‘set’ and ‘membership’.  
  Thus it was that the foundations of set theory became very controversial in the 
first decade of the twentieth century.  Zermelo’s work was at the heart of the 
controversy, as he himself had foreseen in his postcard to Dehn back in 1904.  It is 
possible that he found the continuing excitement rather tiresome, because, when he was 
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invited to address the fifth ICM in Cambridge (England) in 1912, he chose a relatively 
safe subject for his talk. It was ‘Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie 
Schachspeils’ (‘On an Application of Set Theory to the Theory of the Game of Chess’).      
         The talk was published in German in the Proceedings of the ICM (Zermelo 1913).  
Much later, when the subject that we now know as the Theory of Games had been 
established, it was often referred to in historical accounts of that subject.  In 2001 Ulrich 
Schwalbe and Paul Walker published an English translation, with a careful analysis of 
what Zermelo had actually written and the various interpretations that had been 
suggested (Schwalbe and Walker 2001).  Some of the earlier interpretations were  
flawed, and we shall not expand on them here, focussing instead on the part played by 
Zermelo’s paper in later developments.    
         It must be stressed that Zermelo’s main aim was to express some questions in the 
formal language of his Mengenlehre, and to apply some basic ideas from the newly-
formulated theory of infinite sets.  Although this approach to writing a mathematical 
paper is now almost universal, at that time it was quite unusual: sets, functions, 
relations, and the associated terminology, were not the common currency of 
mathematical discourse.   Zermelo did not discuss chess in the form that the game is 
usually played; specifically, he did not consider the rules which require the game to be 
ended as a draw in certain circumstances. He set out to clarify the notion of a winning 
position, by which he meant a position in which one player (usually White) can force a 
win in a finite number of moves, whatever the other player (Black) does. This is the 
situation studied in ‘Chess Problems’, where the solver is given an instruction such as 
‘White to move and mate in three’. Later in this paper we shall describe what Zermelo 
did in a way that illuminates its relationship with subsequent work; but, given the 
misleading accounts of his paper that have appeared, it is as well to begin by stating 
what he did not do.  
First, Zermelo did not attempt to determine the strategy which White should 
employ in order to win.  He was concerned only with the definition of a winning 
position, not the method by which the win could be achieved. Consequently, he was not 
responsible for what is now often referred to by game-theorists as ‘Zermelo’s 
Algorithm’ or ‘backwards induction’.  Furthermore, his arguments about an upper 
bound for the number of moves required to force a win were incomplete, as we shall 
explain when we return to this point.   
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It must also be noted that Zermelo did not refer to the extensive literature on 
games of all kinds which was already in existence. In the 17th century the analysis of 
games of chance had led to the establishment of probability theory as a branch of 
mathematics. As we shall see, probability was to become a basic tool in the analysis of 
games of strategy, but Zermelo himself made no use of it.  The notion of a winning 
position had also been recognised by several authors, including Charles Babbage 
(1864), who discussed the design of an automaton to play the game he called Tit-tat-to 
(Noughts-and-crosses).  More relevant to Zermelo’s purpose, but also not mentioned by 
him, were the papers of Bouton (1901) and Moore (1910) on the game of Nim.  In such 
simple games it is possible to define precisely what is meant by a winning position, and 
to specify a winning strategy—a stark contrast with the situation in Chess. 
  
The Kőnigs and the Theory of Graphs 
Gyula Kőnig had to admit that his claims about well-ordering and the CH were wrong, 
but he continued to work on the foundations of mathematics. Today, he is best known 
for his elegant proof (Kőnig 1906) of a fundamental theorem due to Cantor, Schröder 
and Bernstein. In modern terminology, this says that if there are injections 𝑆 → 𝑇 and 
𝑇 → 𝑆 then there is a bijection 𝑆 ↔ 𝑇.  Equivalently, let #𝑆 denote the cardinal number 
of the set S; then the statements #𝑆 ≤ #𝑇 and #𝑇 ≤ #𝑆 imply that #𝑆 = #𝑇.  Kőnig’s 
proof of this fact is significant because it uses the methods of what we now call the 
Theory of Graphs. 
       Formally, a graph is an abstract object defined by a set of vertices and a set of 
edges. The fact that the vertices and edges can be represented pictorially by points and 
lines often helps us to understand arguments about graphs, and that is why Kőnig’s 
proof of the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein theorem is often quoted.  In Figure 1 the 




Figure 1. Injections 𝑆 → 𝑇 and 𝑇 → 𝑆.  
 
           In the top diagram, an injection  𝑆 → 𝑇 is represented by drawing a grey line 
from each point in 𝑆 to the corresponding point in 𝑇. Note that every point in 𝑆 is at the 
end of a grey line, while each point in 𝑇 may be at the end of either one grey line or no 
grey line.   Similarly, an injection 𝑇 → 𝑆 can be represented by drawing a black line 
from each point in 𝑇 to the corresponding point in 𝑆. When we merge the two diagrams 
(Figure 2) every point now belongs to a unique path, comprising grey lines and black 
lines alternately.   
 
 
Figure 2. Merging the two injections.  
 
These paths can be of four kinds only: 
(1) semi-infinite with an end in 𝑆 (for example, the points labelled a); 
(2) semi-infinite with an end in 𝑇 (for example, the points labelled b); 
(3) finite, with no ends (for example, the points labelled c): 
(4) doubly-infinite (for example the points labelled d). 
In each case it is easy to construct a bijection between the 𝑆-points and the 𝑇-points in 
the path.  For example, in case (1) the grey lines define a bijection.   Combining these 
bijections we obtain a bijection 𝑆 ↔ 𝑇.   
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      Significant results about graphs had been published in the nineteenth century, and 
many of the original papers have been described and translated into English by Biggs, 
Lloyd and Wilson (1976). However, when Gyula Kőnig wrote his paper in 1906, the 
Theory of Graphs was not an established field of mathematical research. The fact that it 
eventually became so was largely the result of the work of Gyula’s son, Dénes.    
            Dénes Kőnig was born in Budapest on 21 September 1884.  His mathematical 
abilities were soon apparent, and he published his first paper in 1899. He attended the 
University of Budapest, and then moved to Göttingen, where he encountered graph-
theoretical notions in various contexts.  For example, he would have heard about the 
paper of Julius Petersen (1891), in which graph terminology was applied to problems of 
invariant theory, following Gordan and Hilbert.  In this paper Petersen also proved a 
fundamental theorem on the factorization of graphs, which was a precursor of Kőnig’s 
later results on this subject.  Dénes attended Hermann Minkowski’s course on topology, 
and he may have been present on the famous occasion when the lecturer attempted 
(unsuccessfully) to give an impromptu solution of the Four Colour Problem.  On his 
return to Budapest his interest was maintained, and in 1911 he wrote two papers on the 
topology of graphs and surfaces (Kőnig 1911).   
          Dénes Kőnig’s interest in graphs was clearly reinforced by his father’s work on 
Set Theory, especially the proof of the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein Theorem.  Shortly 
after Gyula’s death, Dénes completed and published a book that his father had written 
on the foundations of Set Theory and the philosophical background to it (Konig 1914). 
In that year he also gave an address at a conference on mathematical philosophy in 
Paris, in which he discussed some problems about correspondences between infinite 
sets. The outbreak of the Great War delayed publication of the conference proceedings, 
and the talk was not published until many years later, in French (Kőnig 1923). 
However, in 1916 a version appeared in both Hungarian and German (Kőnig 1916).  
This paper contained an important result about finite graphs, obtained as a special case 
of a more general problem about infinite graphs. 
            In his 1916 paper Kőnig considered what we now refer to as edge-colourings of 
a graph. Here colours are assigned to the edges in such a way that no two edges ending 
at the same vertex have the same colour. An obvious lower bound on the number of 
colours required is given by 𝐷,  the largest degree of a vertex, where the degree is the 
number of edges which have that vertex as an end.  Petersen (1898) had given an 
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example of a graph in which all vertices have degree three, but there is no edge-
colouring with three colours. However, Kőnig was able to prove that the lower bound 
𝐷 can always be achieved if the graph has a very simple property.  
           A graph is bipartite if its vertex-set can be split into two parts in such a way that 
every edge has an end in both parts.  Kőnig proved that, in a finite bipartite graph with 
maximum degree 𝐷, an edge-colouring with 𝐷 colours is always possible.  His proof 
used the principle of induction, and it was based on a construction reminiscent of his 
father’s proof of the Cantor-Schröder-Bernstein theorem.  The key idea was to consider 
an alternating path, consisting of edges that have two colours alternately, and to switch 
the colours on that path. This simple idea has many applications, and it became known 
as the Hungarian method. In fact, it was suggested by a technique used by A.B. Kempe 
in his early work on the map-colouring problem, as Kőnig himself wrote later (Kőnig 
1936, 172).  
 
Equilibrium in games of strategy   
Dénes Kőnig remained in Budapest throughout the Great War of 1914-18 and its 
aftermath, teaching at the Technische Hochschule. This was a period of great 
uncertainty and unrest in Hungary, but Dénes continued his mathematical work, and he 
remained in contact with foreign mathematicians.  For example, in the Foreword to his 
father’s book (Kőnig 1914) he thanked Felix Hausdorff for his help, and 1915 he wrote 
to Georg Frobenius about a graph-theoretical proof of a theorem.  (The latter contact 
had unpleasant consequences, which Dénes later explained, at some length, in his book 
(Kőnig 1936, note on page 240)).   
             In Budapest, a new star was rising.  John von Neumann was born into a wealthy 
family of bankers in 1903 and was enrolled as a student of mathematics at the 
University of Budapest in 1921. At the same time, he studied chemistry in Berlin and 
Zurich, returning to Budapest only to take his examinations in mathematics.  He was 
soon recognised as a gifted mathematician, and in the 1920s he published several papers 
on the foundations of set theory, in which (among other things) he modified and 
extended the axiom-system of Zermelo (von Neumann 1923, 1925). He also contributed 
to several other branches of mathematics, including quantum theory, functional 
analysis, and game theory. 
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              In game theory, he proved a fundamental theorem about games with two 
players, X and Y, whose interests are directly opposed. A simple model of this situation 
assumes that each player has a finite number of strategies available, and when X uses 
strategy 𝑟 and Y uses strategy 𝑠 there is a number 𝑚(𝑟, 𝑠) representing the payoff to X. 
The corresponding payoff to Y is −𝑚(𝑟, 𝑠).   This is what we now call a finite, two-
person, zero-sum game, and it is the setting for the remarkable minimax theorem first 
proved by von Neumann in 1926.   
            In fact, the underlying idea was noticed in the early years of the eighteenth 
century and was referred to in an appendix to the 1713 edition of Pierre de Montmort’s 
Essai d’analyse sur les jeux de hazard (Kuhn 1968).  The subject was Le Her, a card 
game which can be represented as a two-person zero-sum game with two strategies for 
each player. There was much debate about how the players should behave when the 
game is played repeatedly, because one player could gain an advantage if it became 
clear that the other player was always using one of the two available strategies. An 
English aristocrat named Waldegrave suggested that each player should adopt a mixed 
strategy, alternating between the two strategies randomly, but according to a rule that 
determined their relative frequency.  For example, if one strategy was to be played in 
70% of the games and the other in 30%, the player could have a bag containing 7 red 
balls and 3 blue balls, and draw one to determine the strategy for each game.  
Waldegrave was able to show that, in the game of Le Her, a mixed strategy was 
preferable to either of the pure strategies.   
              Waldegrave’s suggestion was almost forgotten, but not quite. Over a century 
later it was mentioned in Isaac Todhunter’s massive History of the Mathematical 
Theory of Probability (1865). However, Todhunter’s account (on pages 106-110 of his 
book), was mainly concerned with details of the game, and he did not highlight the 
crucial idea of a mixed strategy.  There would be another long wait before the idea 
finally emerged in a recognizably modern form.  
            Émile Borel was one of the leading French mathematicians of the first half of 
the 20th century, and he was among those who had expressed doubts about Zermelo’s 
use of the Axiom of Choice (Hadamard 1905). He had interests in many areas of 
mathematics, but his major focus was the theory of probability and its applications. He 
may well have read Montmort’s Essai or Todhunter’s History, but we have no evidence 
of this. We do know that in the 1920s he began to develop a theory of strategic games, 
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in which the concept of a mixed strategy was central. His papers on this subject (Borel 
1921, 1924, 1927) developed the theory in the case where both players have the same 
set of strategies, so that the payoffs satisfy the condition 𝑚(𝑠, 𝑟)  =  −𝑚(𝑟, 𝑠). In 
modern terms, this means that the matrix of payoffs is skew-symmetric, and Borel was 
able to use the properties of such matrices to show that, when the number of strategies is 
small, the optimal mixed strategies for the two players have a remarkable property.  
              To explain the general problem, suppose that X and Y both adopt mixed 
strategies, with respective frequencies given by the probability vectors 𝒑 =  (𝑝𝑟) and 
𝒒 =  (𝑞𝑠).  Then the pair of strategies (𝑟, 𝑠) will occur with probability 𝑝𝑟𝑞𝑠, and the 
expectation of the payoff to X will be  
𝐸(𝒑, 𝒒) =  ∑ 𝑚(𝑟, 𝑠)
𝑟,𝑠
𝑝𝑟𝑞𝑠.  
How should X choose 𝒑 in order to guarantee the best possible payoff, given that Y 
may choose any mixed strategy 𝒒?  For any given choice of 𝒑 there is a minimum value 
𝑋(𝒑) of 𝐸(𝒑, 𝒒), taken over all possible choices of 𝒒, and X is guaranteed to gain this 
amount whatever Y does. So the best strategy for X is to choose 𝒑 so that 𝑋(𝒑) is 
maximised.  In other words, X should maximise the minimum expected payoff.  
              Now consider the problem from Y’s point of view. Since we are considering a 
zero-sum game, the payoffs to Y are the negatives of those to X.  In simple terms, this 
means that Y loses what X gains. So Y should choose 𝒒 so that the maximum loss, the 
maximum value 𝑌(𝒒) of 𝐸(𝒑, 𝒒), taken over all possible choices of 𝒑, is minimised.  
The minimax theorem of von Neumann asserts that, when X and Y act in this way, the 
outcome is the same.   The max-min strategy for X and the min-max strategy for Y are 
both optimal from their respective viewpoints, and both are satisfied that they can do no 
better, even though they act independently.  The implication is that there are 
competitive situations in which an equilibrium exists.   Of course, life (although finite) 
is not a two-person zero-sum game, so we must be careful not to place too much faith in 
this beautiful mathematical theorem. 
            Borel had verified that an equilibrium exists in a few special cases, as mentioned 
above, but he had not found a general proof. Indeed, he was uncertain as to whether a 
proof was possible.  The first general proof was presented by von Neumann in a talk to 
the Göttingen Mathematical Society on 7 December 1926. The origins of von 
Neumann’s interest in this problem are unknown. He was certainly familiar with 
Zermelo’s work on set theory and his paper on chess, but that work did not involve any 
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probabilistic notions. It is possible that he had read Montmort or Todhunter, but it is 
more likely that he learned of Borel’s work on mixed strategies during one of his visits 
to Göttingen.  He certainly knew of Borel, since (we are told) he had mastered the 
eminent Frenchman’s Théorie des Fonctions at the age of 12 (Baumol and Goldberg 
1968, 294).  Von Neumann was also in contact with Dénes Kőnig in Budapest (see 
below), so that could equally well have been his source.   
         Von Neumann sent Borel a brief outline of his proof, which Borel communicated 
for publication in the Comptes Rendus (von Neumann 1928a). In this paper von 
Neumann acknowledged Borel’s contributions and stated that he had been working 
independently on a more general version of the same problem.  He said that he had 
obtained an affirmative answer to the main question, and indeed his proof of the 
minimax theorem was soon published in full (von Neumann 1928b).  Borel and von 
Neumann appear to have developed a mutual coolness about their respective 
contributions, as described by Leonard (1992) for example.  Borel failed to mention von 
Neumann’s proof in some of his later publications, while von Neumann (1953) was 
dismissive of Borel’s papers.  
  
The infinity lemma and its application to chess 
In the 1920s, while John von Neumann was travelling around Europe, Dénes Kőnig 
remained in Budapest.  He would surely have known that the proofs of some of the 
results of his 1916 paper on edge-colourings did not extend to infinite graphs. For 
example, he had proved that if a finite bipartite graph has maximum degree 𝐷, then it 
has an edge-colouring with 𝐷 colours. But the induction argument he had used for the 
finite case did not extend to the infinite case.  Eventually, with the aid of a young 
Hungarian mathematician, Istvan Valko, a new approach was discovered, and was 
published in a joint paper (Kőnig and Valko 1926).  Here a simple but powerful new 
idea was applied to several problems in the theory of infinite sets. Many details of this 
work have been described by Franchella (1997).  
           Soon afterwards there appeared a paper (Kőnig 1927) in which the fundamental 
idea was presented as a result about infinite graphs.  We now know it as the Infinity 
Lemma. In 1936 it would feature in Kőnig’s famous book on the Theory of Graphs, 
about which we shall have more to say later. The presentation in the book is similar to 
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that in the 1927 paper, but rather more discursive, and we shall base our story upon it. 
In the book the Infinity Lemma is stated in the following way (Kőnig 1936, 81). 
Let 𝑉1, 𝑉2, 𝑉3,   .  .  .   be a countably infinite sequence of finite, non-empty, 
pairwise disjoint sets, and consider their union as the vertex-set of a graph. If the 
graph has the property that, for  𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,   .  .  . ,  every vertex in 𝑉𝑖+1 is joined 
by an edge to some vertex in 𝑉𝑖, then there is an infinite path  𝑥1𝑥2𝑥3  .  . . ,   
with 𝑥𝑖 in 𝑉𝑖. 
This apparently simple result does indeed require proof, and Kőnig’s 1927 proof is still 
the canonical one that appears in recent texts on the Theory of Graphs, for example 
(Diestel 1997, 190). If just one of the sets 𝑉𝑖 is infinite, the conclusion is false, as we 
shall see below (Figure 4). 
           The Infinity Lemma turns out to be useful in many cases where results about 
finite sets have to be extended to the infinite case. It can also be applied to a problem 
discussed by Zermelo in his 1913 paper on chess. Zermelo had described the game of 
chess along the following lines (but not exactly in these terms).  Define a position to be 
an allocation of pieces to the squares of the board which can occur in a legal game of 
chess. For technical reasons it is necessary to add information about such things as 
whose turn to move it is, and the situation regarding the promotion of pawns and 
castling. These additions do not affect the fact that the set of all positions is finite.  A W-
move is an ordered pair (𝑓, 𝑔) of positions where 𝑓 is a position in which it is White’s 
turn, and 𝑔 is the result of one legal move by White.  A B-move is defined similarly. 
Given any set 𝑆 of positions with Black to move, let 𝑆∗ be the set of all positions 𝑦 such 
that (𝑥, 𝑦) is a B-move for some 𝑥 in 𝑆.  
           Zermelo defined 𝑓 to be a winning position for White if there is a sequence of 
non-empty sets 𝑆1, 𝑆2,  𝑆3, …  satisfying three conditions. In the terminology defined 
above (which is a paraphrase of Kőnig’s version of Zermelo’s original) they are as 
follows (Figure 3). 
(1)  𝑆1 comprises a single element 𝑔 and (𝑓, 𝑔) is a W-move. 
(2)  For 𝑖 = 1, 2, … , and each position 𝑦 in 𝑆𝑖
∗, there is a W-move (𝑦, 𝑧) with 𝑧 
in 𝑆𝑖+1. 
(3)  The sequence is finite and results in a win for White:  that is, there is an 







Figure 3. Illustrating Zermelo’s definition. 
 
In Condition 1, the assumption that the set 𝑆1 contains only one position, so that 
White’s opening move (𝑓, 𝑔) is the unique ‘key’ to winning (as is usually the case in 
chess problems) is not strictly necessary. Condition 2 says that whatever Black does, 
White has a reply that will eventually result in a win.  Condition 3 says that Black 
cannot prolong the game indefinitely, a necessary condition since Zermelo’s framework 
allowed infinite sequences of moves. Note that this condition implies that 𝑆𝑁
∗  is empty, 
but not conversely, because of the possibility of stalemate.  
Zermelo’s objective was to formulate a precise definition. He did not develop 
any theory based on it, and he did not suggest rules for constructing a winning strategy.  
However, regarding Condition 3, he did claim that if such a number 𝑁 exists, then it can 
be chosen to be not greater than 𝑁0, the total number of possible positions.  His 
argument was that if more than 𝑁0 moves have been made, then some position 𝑝 must 
have been repeated. Since White has a strategy which wins after the last occurrence of 
𝑝, White could have won after the first occurrence of 𝑝 by using that strategy. This 
argument assumes that when a position is repeated for a second time, Black will play in 
the same way as before, which is clearly not the case.  Kőnig (1927, and 1936, 116) 
credits John von Neumann for drawing his attention to the relevance of the Infinity 
Lemma, so the two men must have been in contact around 1926, when von Neumann 
was working on the minimax theorem.  
The application of the Infinity Lemma to Zermelo’s formulation of chess is 
straightforward.  Take the sets 𝑉 to be the sets 𝑆 and 𝑆∗, linked by edges as in Figure 3; 
by definition, these sets are finite. If all these sets were non-empty, the Infinity Lemma 
would guarantee an infinite path, and Black could prolong the game indefinitely.  If that 
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is not so, one of the sets must be empty, and there is a number 𝑁, as required. Kőnig 
communicated this result to Zermelo, who responded with a revised proof of his claim 
that 𝑁 ≤  𝑁0, and this was published as an Addendum to the 1927 paper. 
In Kőnig’s more general formulation of a game, the set of all possible positions 
is not assumed to be finite. But for each position he allows only finitely many possible 
moves, and he gives an example to show why this is the critical condition (Kőnig 1936, 
115). His example is illustrated in Figure 4, using our terminology. Suppose that, after 
White’s opening move (𝑓, 𝑔), Black has available a countably infinite set of moves 
(𝑔, ℎ𝑗), 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3, …  .  Suppose also that the rules of the game allow the set 𝑆2 to be 
defined so that, for each position ℎ𝑗 , there is a W-move (ℎ𝑗 , 𝑠2𝑗),  where 𝑠21 is a 
‘checkmate’ position and 𝑠2𝑗 (𝑗 > 1) admits only one possible B-move (𝑠2𝑗, 𝑠2,𝑗−1
∗ ).  
The sets  𝑆𝑖 = {𝑠𝑖1, 𝑠𝑖2, . . .  } and  𝑆𝑖
∗ = {𝑠𝑖1
∗ , 𝑠𝑖2
∗ , . . .   } for 𝑖 > 2 are defined similarly. The 
W-moves are of the form  (𝑠𝑖𝑗
∗ , 𝑠𝑖+1,𝑗), the B-moves are of the form (𝑠𝑖𝑗, 𝑠𝑖,𝑗−1
∗ ), and 
the positions  𝑠21, 𝑠31, . ..   are checkmates by White.    
 
Figure 4. Kőnig’s example: Black has infinitely many choices for the first move.  
 
In this game White is certain to win after a finite number of moves, but there is no upper 
bound on the number of moves required. If Black chooses ℎ𝑗  on the first move, then the 
game will end after 𝑗 moves by White. 
     
  
Conclusion 
Ernst Zermelo’s work on the foundations of Set Theory led, almost incidentally, to his 
attempt to formulate a mathematical basis for the game of chess, and he later returned to 
this topic in the light of the Infinity Lemma. The Kőnigs, Gyula amd Dénes, developed 
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graph-theoretical ideas in order to prove results about infinite sets, and Dénes applied 
these ideas to Game Theory.  John von Neumann expanded Zermelo’s foundation for 
Set Theory and, for reasons unknown to us, went on to prove the Minimax Theorem for 
two-person zero-sum games. These links benefitted the development of the three 
disciplines, and extended the scope of Mathematics generally. In the first decades of the 
twentieth century there were many opportunities for the exchange of information by 
word-of-mouth, and some of the contacts that facilitated this process have left no trace. 
        The work covered in this article was the first slim volume in an ever-increasing 
library of mathematical books. Kőnig’s book (1936) was the first in which the Theory 
of Graphs was treated as a subject in its own right.  It contains several sections on 
games of various kinds, and the  theory of infinite sets is prominent, including the 
Infinity Lemma and its applications, along the lines described above.  There are now 
many books on the Theory of Graphs, and the Lemma has found many new 
applications. For example, it is frequently employed as a ‘compactness argument’ in the 
branch of combinatorics that we call Ramsey Theory (Diestel 1997).    John von 
Neumann’s proof of the Minimax Theorem for two-person zero-sum games was to have 
a profound effect on the study of games of strategy.  In the 1930s von Neumann began 
to collaborate with the economist Oskar Morgenstern, and the result was their famous 
book, Theory of Games and Economic Behavior (von Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).  
The central idea of equilibrium has since been extended to a much wider class of games, 
and it is a key paradigm of modern economic theory.  
 
Acknowledgement 
The author wishes to acknowledge helpful conversations with Professor Bernhard von 
Stengel and constructive comments from an anonymous referee.    
 
Bibliography  
Babbage, Charles, Passages from the life of a philosopher. London: Longmans, 1864. 
Baumol, William, and Goldberg, Stephen, Precursors in mathematical economics. London: London 
               School of Economics, 1968.   
Biggs, Norman, Lloyd, Keith, and Wilson, Robin, Graph theory 1736-1936. Oxford:  
University Press, 1976. 
Borel, E, La théorie du jeu et les équations integrals à noyau symétrique gauche. 
Compt. Rend. Acad. Sci. (Paris) 173 (1921) 1304-1308. 
16 
 
Borel, E, Sur les jeux ou interviennent l’hasard et l’habilité des joueurs.  In: Théorie des Probabilités,  
Paris: Libraire Scientifique (1924).  
Borel, E, Sur les systémes de forms lineaires a déterminant symétrique gauche et la théorie générale du 
jeu.  Compt. Rend. Acad. Sci. (Paris) 184 (1927) 52-54. 
Bouton, Charles, Nim: A game with a complete mathematical theory. Ann. Math. 3 (1901) 35-39. 
Diestel, Reinhard, Graph theory. Berlin: Springer, 1997. 
Ebbinghaus, H-D, Zermelo and the Heidelberg congress 1904.  Historia Math. 34 (2007) 428-432.   
Franchella, Miriam, On the origins of Dénes Kőnig’s infinity lemma.  Arch. Hist. Exact Sci. 51 (1997) 3- 
27.    
Gray, Jeremy, The Hilbert challenge, Oxford: University Press, 2000. 
Hadamard, Jacques, Cinq lettres sur la théorie des ensembles.  Bull. Soc. Math. de France 33 (1905) 261- 
273. 
van Heijenoort, J, From Frege to Godel: A source book in mathematical logic 1879-1931 Cambridge: 
Harvard University Press, 1967.  
Hilbert, David, Mathematische Probleme. Archiv für Mathematik und Physik, I (1901), 44-63 and 213- 
237.   
Kőnig, Dénes, Vonalrendszerek ketoldahlu feuleteken [Graphs on two-sided surfaces]. Mat. Termeszettud 
  Ertesito 29 (1911) 112-117; A vonalrendserek nemszamarol [On the genus of graphs] 345-350. 
Kőnig, Dénes, Über Graphen und ihre Anwendung auf Determinantentheorie und Mengenlehre. Math. 
Ann. 77 (1916) 453-465. 
Kőnig, Dénes, Sur un problème de la théorie générale des ensembles et la théorie des graphes.   Rev. 
              Métaphysique Morale 30 (1923) 443-449. 
Kőnig, Dénes,   Über eine Schlussweise aus dem Endlichen ins Unendliche.   Acta Litt. Sci. Szeged 3 
(1927) 121-130. 
Kőnig,  Dénes, Theorie der endlichen und unendlichlen Graphen Leipzig, 1936.  
Kőnig, Dénes, and Valko, Istvan, Über mehrdeutige Abbildungen von Mengen, Math. Ann. 98 (1926)  
135-138.  
Kőnig, Julius [Gyula], Sur la théorie des ensembles. Compt. Rend. Acad. Sci.(Paris) 143 (1906) 110-112. 
Kőnig, Julius [Gyula], Neue Grundlagen der Logik, Arithmetik und Mengenlehre  Leipzig, 1914.   
Kuhn, Harold, Preface [to an excerpt from Montmort’s letter to Nicholas Bernoulli].  In: Baumol, W.J.  
and Goldfield, S. (eds.)  Precursors in mathematical economics. London: LSE (1968), pp.3-9.  
Leonard, Robert, Creating a context for game theory, History of Political Economy 24 (1992) 29-76.  
Moore, E.H., A generalization of the game called Nim. Ann. Math. 11 (1910) 93-94.  
von Neumann, John, Zie Einführung der transfinite Zahlen. Acta Litt. Acad. Sci. Szeged 1 (1923)  
               199-208. 
von Neumann, John, Die Axiomatisierung der Mengenlehre. J. f. Math.154 (1925) 219-240. 
von Neumann, John, Sur la théorie des jeux. Compt. Rend. Acad. Sci. (Paris) 186 (1928a) 1689-1691. 
von Neumann, John, Zur theorie der Gesellschaftsspiele, Math. Ann. 100 (1928b) 295-320.   
von Neumann, John, Communication on the Borel notes, Econometrica 21 (1953) 124-127. 
von Neumann, John, and Morgenstern, Oskar, Theory of games and economic behavior, Princeton:  
17 
 
University Press (1944).  
Petersen, Julius, Die Theorie der regulären graphs. Acta Math. 15 (1891) 193-220. 
Petersen, Julius, Sur la théoreme de Tait. L’Intermédiare des Math. 5 (1898) 225-227.  
Schwalbe, U, and Walker, P, Zermelo and the early history of game theory. Games and Economic 
Behavior 34 (2001), 123-137.  
Todhunter, Isaac, A history of the mathematical theory of probability. Cambridge:  
University Press (1865). 
Winston Newson, Mary (tr.), Mathematical problems. Bull. Amer. Math. Soc., 8 (1902), 437-479. 
Zermelo, Ernst, Beweis dass jeder Menge wohlgeordnet werden kann. Math. Ann. 59 (1904) 514-516. 
Zermelo, Ernst, Neuer Beweis fur die Mengenlehre einer Wohlordnung. Math. Ann. 65 (1908a) 107-128. 
Zermelo, Ernst, Untersuchungen uber die Grundlagen der Mengenlehre I. Math. Ann. 65 (1908b) 261-
281. 
Zermelo, Ernst, Über eine Anwendung der Mengenlehre auf die Theorie Schachspeils, Proceedings of the 
fifth international congress of mathematicians. Cambridge: University Press (1913).  
